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It’s Not a Tax (Statutorily), but It Is a Tax (Constitutionally)
By Steve R. Johnson*
On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court handed down its decision on 
the validity of the individual mandate, a 
key portion of so-called ObamaCare. 
National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 
2566. The sharply divided Court held 
that, constitutionally, Congress does not 
have authority to compel persons to 
purchase medical insurance but does 
have authority to impose a non-coercive 
tax on persons who choose not to 
purchase such insurance.
Three aspects of NFIB are of principal 
significance to tax professionals: (1) its 
treatment of the anti-Injunction act (aIa), 
(2) its discussion of the Taxing Power, 
and (3) its preservation of the myriad tax 
increases contained in the upheld 
legislation. The third of these will present 
practical challenges for lawyers and 
accountants whose clients have been 
putting off preparing for these taxes in 
the hope that they would go away 
because of Supreme Court action or the 
results of the November elections. 
Several of them are discussed elsewhere 
in this issue of NewsQuarterly. The first 
and second are more conceptually meaty 
and are discussed below following 
background information.
Background
In 2010, Congress radically revised 
the structure and delivery of medical care 
in the United States through the Patient 
Protection and affordable Care act, as 
amended by the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation act. among 
numerous other changes, this legislation 
added section 5000a to the Code. 
Beginning in 2014, this section requires 
non-exempt persons to have medical 
insurance or else make a “shared 
responsibility payment” along with their 
income tax returns each year.
Many suits have been brought 
challenging the constitutionality of 
various aspects of the legislation. NFIB 
resulted in four opinions. Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote the lead opinion. Justice 
Ginsburg, joined in part or whole by 
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, 
concurred in part, concurred in the 
judgment, and dissented in part. Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and alito 
participated in a joint unsigned dissent. 
Justice Thomas also penned a separate 
dissent to emphasize his position that the 
“substantially affects interstate 
commerce” prong should be excised from 
Commerce Clause analysis.
The opinions addressed five issues. first, 
all nine Justices agreed that the aIa did not 
prevent the Court from deciding the merits 
of the case. Second, five Justices (the Chief 
Justice and the four joint dissenters) agreed 
that, under the Commerce Clause and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress 
cannot compel persons to acquire medical 
insurance. Third, five Justices (the Chief 
Justice and the four in the Ginsburg opinion) 
agreed that the shared responsibility 
payment is constitutional under the Taxing 
Power. fourth, seven Justices (the Chief 
Justice, the four joint dissenters, and 
Justices Breyer and Kagan) agreed that, 
under the Spending Power, Congress could 
not threaten the states with loss of their 
existing Medicaid funding if they decline 
to comply with the legislation’s expansion 
of Medicaid. fifth, since they would have 
wholly invalidated the individual mandate 
and the Medicaid expansion, the four 
joint dissenters went on to consider the 
severability issue. Concluding that these 
provisions cannot be severed without 
fundamentally disturbing the balance 
Congress sought to achieve, the joint 
dissenters would have invalidated the 
entirety of the Patient Protection and 
Reconciliation acts.
AIA
With enumerated statutory exceptions 
and very limited judicial exceptions, 
section 7421(a) provides that “no suit for 
the purpose of restraining the 
assessment or collection of any tax shall 
be maintained in any court by any 
person.” Only one lower court had held 
that the aIa bans on-the-merits review of 
the individual mandate. Liberty Univ. v. 
Geithner, 671 f.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011).
Based on the oral argument, many 
predicted that Liberty University would be 
unanimously reversed, and this prediction 
proved correct. The Chief Justice reasoned 
that Congress labelled the shared 
responsibility payment as a penalty, not a 
tax. The label is not controlling for 
constitutional purposes, but it is for 
statutory purposes. 132 S. Ct. at 2583 
(the aIa and the 2010 acts “are creatures 
of Congress’s own creation. How they 
relate to each other is up to Congress.”).
The Chief Justice also rejected a “more 
circuitous” argument for applying the 
aIa. Section 5000a(g)(1) states that the 
payment “shall be assessed and 
collected in the same manner as an 
assessable penalty under subchapter B 
of chapter 68.” In turn, under section 
6671(a), assessable penalties “shall be 
assessed and collected in the same 
manner as taxes.” However, the Chief 
Justice viewed section 5000a(g)(1) only 
as direction to the Service as to 
methodology and procedures it should 
apply in collecting the payment, not as a 
direction to the courts that they are to 
apply the aIa. 132 S. Ct. at 2583–84.
The joint dissent went further. “That 
the penalty is to be ‘assessed and 
collected in the same manner as taxes’ 
refutes the proposition that it is a tax for 
all statutory purposes, including with 
respect to the [aIa].” Id. at 2656 n.6 
(emphasis in original). The joint dissent 
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also argued that, in other places in the 
code, congress provided both that an 
item shall be “assessed and collected” in 
the same manner as a tax and that suits 
to restrain assessment and collection are 
prohibited. “the latter directive would be 
superfluous if the former invoked the 
[AIA].” Id. (citing sections 7421(b)(1), 
6901(a) & 6305(a), (b)).
finally, the chief Justice rejected a 
contention based on section 6201(a), 
which authorizes the Service to assess 
“all taxes (including interest, additional 
amounts, additions to the tax, and 
assessable penalties).” from this, it was 
argued that the shared responsibility 
payment must be a tax because it is an 
assessable penalty. the chief Justice 
found this argument forceful “only if  
§ 6201(a) is read in isolation” since  
“[t]he code contains many provisions 
treating taxes and assessable penalties 
as distinct terms.” 132 S. ct. at 2584 
(citing sections 860(h)(1), 6324A(a), 
6601(e)(1)–(2), 6671(a) & 7122(b)). 
Again, this language was read as 
instruction to the Service that it has 
assessment authority, not as instruction 
to the courts to apply the AIA. the joint 
dissent added: “the fact that [assessable 
penalties] are included as ‘taxes’ for 
purposes of assessment does not 
establish that they are included as ‘taxes’ 
for purposes of other sections …, such 
as the [AIA], that do not contain similar 
‘including’ language.” Id. at 2656 n.6.
thus, the AIA does not apply to 
pre-enforcement challenges to the 
shared responsibility payment. 
theoretically, new challenges against it 
could go forward if not barred by res 
judicata. However, the AIA still should 
apply with respect to the numerous “real 
taxes” imposed by the 2010 legislation.
Taxing Power
Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the 
constitution sets out both the taxing 
Power and the Spending Power. It 
authorizes congress “[t]o lay and collect 
taxes … to pay the Debts and provide for 
the common Defence and general welfare 
of the united States.” the chief Justice 
conceded that “[t]he most straightforward 
reading” is that the individual mandate is 
a requirement enforced by a penalty, not 
that it is a tax. 132 S. ct. at 2593.
nonetheless, he (joined by the four 
Justices of the Ginsburg group) upheld 
the shared responsibility payment as a 
valid exercise of the taxing Power. the 
chief Justice reasoned as follows. first, 
“[t]he text of a statute can sometimes 
have more than one possible meaning.” 
Id. at 2593. Second, “if a statute has 
two possible meanings, one of which 
violates the constitution, courts should 
adopt the meaning that does not do so.” 
Id. third, although this is not “the most 
natural interpretation of the mandate,” 
reading the provision as a tax is one “fairly 
possible” rendition of it. Id. at 2594.
to support the “fairly possible” 
position, the chief Justice observed that 
the measure possesses “the essential 
feature of any tax: it produces at least 
some revenue for the Government.” Id. 
He also noted particular features of 
section 5000A: that the payment is 
made to the treasury, by “taxpayer[s]” 
when they file their income tax returns, if 
they are required to file; that the amount 
of the payment is determined by features 
familiar under the income tax; that the 
provision is lodged in the code; and that 
it is assessed and collected by the Service 
“in the same manner as taxes.” Id.
the joint dissent maintained that the 
“fairly possible” principle does not 
authorize a court to “rewrite the statute to 
be what it is not” and that there was no 
way to escape that the individual 
mandate involves a penalty, not a tax. Id. 
at 2651. the joint dissent advanced a 
number of structural features in support 
of this proposition, including as “the nail 
in the coffin” that the mandate and 
payment are in title I of the Patient 
Protection Act, its operative core, not in 
title Ix, containing its “revenue 
Provisions.” Id. at 2655. the joint dissent 
also noted that 18 times in section 
5000A and other parts of the legislation 
the measure is called a “penalty.” Id. at 
2653. the dissenters also objected that 
the question of whether the tax (if it be 
such) was a direct tax requiring 
apportionment had been inadequately 
briefed and analyzed. Id. at 2655.
Among the key questions resulting 
from NFIB is how aggressively congress 
will choose to push its taxing Power 
authority to regulate. NFIB prohibits 
congress from requiring persons to act 
under the commerce clause, but it 
permits congress to tax persons for not 
acting. what, if any, limits are there on 
the ability of congress to regulate 
indirectly via the taxing Power?
on the one hand, the chief Justice 
observed that “[e]very tax is in some 
measure regulatory,” id. at 2596 
(quoting Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 
u.S. 506, 513 (1937)), and he noted 
that “taxes that seek to influence conduct 
are nothing new.” 132 S. ct. at 2596.
on the other hand, the chief Justice 
sought to reassure that “congress’s ability 
to use its taxing power to influence 
conduct is not without limits.” Id. at 2599. 
At some point, a measure laden with 
regulatory and punitive features crosses 
out of the “tax” category. the chief Justice 
declined to define that point. It is an open 
question whether such definition is 
possible via judicially manageable 
standards or whether future cases will 
have “eye of the beholder” unpredictability.
the closest thing to suggestion of a 
limiting principle is the chief Justice’s 
observation that the amount of the shared 
responsibility payment “for most Americans 
… will be far less than the price of 
insurance,” thus that many may rationally 
choose to pay the “tax” rather than accede 
to congress’s desire that they buy medical 
insurance. Id. at 2595; see also id. 
(distinguishing a prior case in part on the 
ground that the exaction styled as a tax but 
recharacterized by the court as a penalty 
“imposed an exceedingly heavy burden”). 
Plainly, however, future cases will have to 
wrestle with the extent to which congress 
can achieve indirectly under the taxing 
Power what it cannot achieve directly 
under the commerce clause. n
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